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ABSTRACT 
 
Hollywood has dominated the global film business since the First World War. 
Economic formulas used by governments to assess levels of industry dominance 
typically measure market share to establish the degree of industry concentration. The 
business literature reveals that a marketing orientation strongly correlates with 
superior market performance and that market leaders that possess a set of six superior 
marketing capabilities are able to continually outperform rival firms. 
 
This paper argues that the historical evidence shows that the Hollywood Majors have 
consistently outperformed rival firms and rival film industries in each of those six 
marketing capabilities and that unless rivals develop a similarly integrated and 
cohesive strategic marketing management approach to the movie business and match 
the Major studios’ superior capabilities, then Hollywood’s dominance will continue. 
 
This paper also proposes that in cyberspace, whilst the Internet does provide a 
channel that democratises film distribution, the flat landscape of the world wide web 
means that in order to stand out from the clutter of millions of cyber-voices seeking 
attention, independent film companies need to possess superior strategic marketing 
management capabilities and develop effective e-marketing strategies to find a niche, 
attract a loyal online audience and prosper. 
 
However, mirroring a recent CIA report forecasting a multi-polar world economy, this 
paper also argues that potentially serious longer-term rivals are emerging and will 
increasingly take a larger slice of an expanding global box office as India, China and 
other major developing economies and their respective cultural channels grow and 
achieve economic parity with or surpass the advanced western economies. Thus, in 
terms of global market share over time, Hollywood’s slice of the pie will 
comparatively diminish in an emerging multi-polar movie business. 
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PART 1: HOW DID HOLLYWOOD DOMINATE FOR A CENTURY? 
  
Introduction 
 
The Major Hollywood studios have dominated the global box office since the First 
World War, and surprisingly compared to other industries, without any really serious 
or sustained competition from rival firms or rival film industries.  Whilst over time, 
there have been multiple changes of ownership of the Majors and two periods where 
most Majors went broke twice (1930s - Great Depression and 1960s when they had to 
be recapitalised by new owners), during a century of truly dramatic geopolitical, 
social, cultural and technological change, it is hard to think of another example where 
a small number of corporations or brands have so completely dominated an industry 
in the face of such developments over a span of nine decades.  
 
A multi-disciplinary review of the relevant literature on Hollywood’s dominance and 
the global popularity of its movies, revealed twenty one potential explanations for that 
dominance, yet none of them individually or collectively seem able to account for 
such high levels of concentrated market power over such a long period of time.  
 
For example, the ‘structuralist’ school within the economics discipline argues that 
industry structure and the size and scale economies of the Majors enable them to 
dominate the movie business. Yet when the first Majors - Universal, Fox and Famous 
Players (which became Paramount) were founded between 1912-1915, they were 
comparatively small film companies facing the combined economic might of the 
Thomas Edison inspired Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) that comprised the 
most powerful film companies in the U.S. as well as the largest film company in the 
world.  
 
Logically then, if dominance was really just about size and scale and industry 
structure, how then could the emerging Hollywood studios have possibly challenged 
and surpassed the MPPC’s market power within a few years when facing the 
combined economic clout of the old line firms - Pathe, Edison, Biograph and other 
members of the MPPC? And if dominance were just about size and scale, then why 
did Britain’s Rank Organisation in the 1940s and 50s not become a globally dominant 
player equal to any of the Hollywood Majors when it’s corporate assets were larger 
than any individual Hollywood studio and it also owned 25% of Universal?  And how 
could Disney evolve from a small, niche company specialising in animation into a 
Major studio in its own right when competing with the combined market power of the 
other Hollywood Majors? Whilst it is obvious that size and scale economies and 
industry structure must be key factors in why firms dominate, they cannot completely 
explain the emergence of Hollywood or its enduring dominance in the face of 
significant industry change over a 100-year period. 
 
Another more recent explanation advanced from within the media studies discipline 
proposes that the underlying cause of Major studio dominance is that their movies are 
transparent because they tell stories with universal themes i.e. “certain texts seem 
familiar regardless of their origin, to seem part of one’s own culture, even though they 
have been crafted elsewhere” (Olson p. 18). The unrivalled global popularity of 
Pathe’s films from the early-to-mid 1900s until the First World War would also seem 
to indicate that its films were also ‘transparent’, yet within a decade, Hollywood was 
 3 
able to surpass the French company in the world film market. And the many 
thousands of best selling novels that have emerged from all over the world indicate, 
that the ability to tell transparent stories is not limited to the United States, so whilst 
transparency theory may well be a significant contributing factor to Hollywood’s 
dominance it alone cannot fully account for Major studio dominance over time. 
 
Similarly when the other nineteen explanations of Hollywood’s dominance that we 
identified were critically analysed, individually or together, none them of them could 
fully account for the Majors unrivalled market leadership for almost a century.  
 
We then turned our attention to the business literature on market dominance to seek 
answers as to how and why market leaders achieve and sustain their positions. 
 
There is hard evidence in the business literature that a marketing orientation is 
positively correlated to superior business performance (Narver & Slater 1990; 
Jaworski & Kohli 1992; Deshpande, Farley &Webster 1993; Day 1994), and that 
market-driven firms that have developed a set of six superior marketing capabilities to 
their rivals and consequently are are able to outperform their less market-driven rivals 
on four critical dimensions – firm growth, customer satisfaction, adaptability and 
profitability (Vorhies & Harker 2000).  
 
We contend that the historical evidence demonstrates that the Hollywood Majors have 
consistently outperformed rival firms and rival film industries because they were 
marketing orientated and possessed six superior strategic marketing capabilities that 
are common to market leaders and that unless rivals develop a similarly integrated 
and holistic strategic marketing management approach to the movie business and 
match the Major studios’ superior capabilities, then Hollywood’s dominance will 
continue. 
 
 
Strategically orientated firms are outwardly focused and responsive to change 
 
Strategically orientated firms seek to ‘shape’ their environment and create a 
sustainable competitive advantage by providing superior value to customers (Aaker 
and Mills 2005 pp. 4-7, Cravens 2000 p. 5). This paper argues that over the course of 
their first nine decades, whilst there have been periodic lapses (1960s), generally the 
Majors collectively “fit” the model of strategically orientated firms. 
 
Marketing-driven firms outperform rivals and possess six common capabilities 
 
Field research by Vorhies, Harker & Rao (1999); Vorhies and Harker (2000) and a 
benchmarking study by Vorhies and Morgan (2005) identified six key marketing 
capabilities that typically characterised the best-performing market-driven firms and 
enabling them to consistently outperform their rivals: a) systematic and strategic use 
of marketing research (marketing intelligence and market research) to optimise 
exploitation of market potential. b) Development of new products designed to match 
consumer needs and desires and therefore outperform competitor offerings. c) 
Strategic use of competitive pricing. d) Effective distribution and marketing channel 
strategy e) Effective promotional strategies and marketing communications that 
persuade consumers to buy and f) effective leadership that maintains an externally 
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focused and responsive strategic orientation and cohesively manages the firm’s 
marketing mix to satisfy existing and potential customers and markets. 
 
THE MAJORS’ SUPERIOR MARKETING CAPABILITIES  
 
1. Market Research and Marketing Intelligence 
 
The historical evidence shows that the Majors have been undertaking marketing 
intelligence activities since the 1920s through a variety of channels.  For example, 
three of the Big Five Major studios engaged in marketing intelligence-gathering 
activities during the 1930s. William Fox studied every aspect of his corporation’s 
business as well as the wider industry and foreign markets. (Sinclair 1970 pp 5-6; 51).  
A Harvard study from the 1930s found that Paramount and Universal were actively 
scanning the external environment trying to anticipate trends and changing audience 
tastes in order to develop new movies that would match those changing needs (Lewis 
1933).  Four of the old Hollywood’s studio chiefs conducted regular observation of 
audiences (Zukor 1953 pp 37 and 43; Ramsaye1954 p. 240; Stohr 2004; Eyman 2005 
p. 298). 
 
The Majors conducted various forms of market research since the late 1910s and early 
1920s (Zukor 1953 p. 37, 223; Franklin in Waller 2000 p. 158); Paramount 
commissioned the first exhibitor survey in 1916 and Universal hired a psychologist to 
assess market reactions to various plots and to forecast public reaction in the first 
evidence of market demand studies  (Bakker 2003); primitive consumer panels using 
staff members were established at Warner Brothers as early as 1922 (Hampton 1970 
pp. 311-312).  Hollywood also pioneered tracking studies and market segmentation 
research in the 1930s (Bakker 2003); the Majors have commissioned regular movie-
going audience surveys since the 1930s (Garrison 1972 pp. 146-147) and studies of 
advertising effectiveness also began in the 1940s (Fiske and Handel 1947 p. 274-275). 
 
Only the French film company Pathe, the global market leader in the pre-Hollywood 
era, was found to have systematically collected marketing intelligence on any scale, 
or to have undertaken any other form of marketing research and then used that 
intelligence to strategically respond to changing market conditions (Abel 1999 p. 89; 
p. 177; New York Times 1913).  We found no evidence of rival film studios 
undertaking any form of marketing research and rival distributors have not operated 
on the same scale as Hollywood in global markets and hence have had less well 
developed channel relations.  
 
 
2. The Majors’ superior new product development capabilities  
 
Fundamental differences were found in the approach to script development taken by 
Hollywood relative to other film industries, with marketing dominating the American 
approach (Ross and d’Amico 1996).  A leading global consulting firm - Booz Allen 
and Hamilton (1988) studied over 700 corporations and found that most new products 
fail. It developed a systematic eight-stage new product development (NPD) process 
now widely used or mimicked in most industries. We found that the Major studio 
approach to NPD is aligned to the Booz Allen model.  The NPD process employed by 
Hollywood since the 1920s is rarely if ever used by its rivals and they spend far less 
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than Hollywood on the script development process (Dale 1997 p. 164; Zee News 
2006).  
 
3. The Majors’ superior distribution capabilities 
 
Hollywood’s superior distribution capabilities are the result of several factors:-  1) 
The Major studios’ strategies of intensive global market coverage. 2) Hollywood’s 
enduring strategy of temporally regulating the flow of new movies into the market 
and adapting release patterns in each era to suit changing market conditions. This 
enabled Hollywood to roadblock access to screens (by rivals) via Major studio theatre 
ownership before Divorcement was enacted in 1948, and since then, using distribution 
strategies involving wider and wider releases for tent-pole movies.  3) The nurturing 
of enduring business relationships with the world’s theatre chains that prefer ‘the 
Hollywood brand’ when booking movies. 
 
Since the late 1910s, Hollywood’s Major studios have maintained the largest 
distribution networks at home and abroad.  The overwhelming channel-dominance of 
the Majors and their ongoing ability to block access to movie theatres by rivals meant 
that by 1944 independent distributors had basically vanished from the U.S. market 
(Huettig 1944 pp. 143-150).  From the mid-1930s to the early 1970s, the biggest 
Majors – Warner, Fox, M.G.M. and Paramount maintained large global networks 
generally above 90 offices worldwide (Film Daily Yearbooks; International Motion 
Picture Almanacs). In 1948, Rank/Eagle Lion’s presence in world markets (6 other 
foreign sales offices plus the U.S.) was dwarfed by the international presence of the 
Major Hollywood studios (International Motion Picture Almanac 1948-1949). 
 
Table       Snapshot of the world’s largest film companies foreign market exposure in 1948 
Film Company U.S. / Canadian 
branches 
Number of foreign distribution sales offices in 1948 
Warner Brothers 31 + 6 105 
Paramount 32 + 6 104 
MGM 32 89 
Columbia Pictures 31 88 
United Artists 25 + 6 85 + 20 sub-distributors 
20th Century-Fox 31 + 6 75 + 6 agents 
R.K.O. 32 + 6 50 
Universal 32 42 
Republic Pictures 32 + 1 11 foreign sales offices + 33 franchised agents 
Monogram Pictures 31 9 foreign sales offices  
Rank / Eagle Lion Based in New York 
(8 regional sales 
managers) and 
Toronto (1) 
6 other foreign sales offices located in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, 
New Zealand, Palestine and in Australia (through Rank’s 50% ownership 
of Greater Union and its distribution subsidiary British Empire Films.) 
 
4.  The Majors’ promotional capabilities 
 
Prior to the 1970s, ‘exploitation’ was the general term used within the movie business 
to describe ‘marketing’ as contemporary marketing scholars understand it. 
“Exploitation was all of the advertising, publicity, merchandising, licensing and 
promotion of a motion picture” (Cones 1992 p. 176).  Since the 1970s the Majors’ 
‘exploitation departments’ were re-constituted and re-badged as marketing 
departments.  During the Studio Era, movie marketing was partially de-centralised, 
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with theatre managers in the studio-owned circuits trained in exploitation 
(promotional) methods playing an active role in local promotions (Gomery in Waller 
2002 pp 129).   Press books were devised by advertising, publicity and promotions 
experts in the studio, and provided theatres with a range of pre-approved ads, posters, 
ready-to-publish feature stories and promotional ideas that could be employed in the 
local market.  Following Divorcement and the rise of TV during the 1950s, the Majors 
centralised marketing communications and increasingly used saturation-advertising 
campaigns to drive the ever-widening releases of their blockbusters.  
 
Old Hollywood’ primarily used below-the-line marketing communications strategies 
to stimulate audience demand for movies and drove their promotional campaigns with 
a combination of publicity, showmanship, merchandising, plus some advertising. 
Studios immediately supported the new fan magazines (Motion Picture Story, 
Photoplay) that began appearing from around 1911-1912, exploiting this new 
publicity channel by placing stories about their stars and movies. By 1919, fan 
magazine readership exceeded one million (Staiger 1990 p. 10) and was a key channel 
for movie publicity throughout the Studio Era.   
 
Washington’s ongoing assistance to Hollywood helped it penetrate overseas markets 
and neutralise trade barriers, however assistance from Washington over the decades 
has been an outcome of Hollywood’s ongoing PR lobby via the MPPDA/MPAA. All 
past and current Presidents of the MPPDA/MPAA have been senior Washington 
insiders. Thus the U.S. government support stems from a strategic marketing 
capability – in this instance PR (using a government lobby) – part of the marketing 
communications / promotional mix and one of Vorhies and Harker’s (2000) six 
critical marketing capabilities. 
 
The Majors have consistently out-spent the rest of the world in advertising their 
movies. For example, in 1939 US film industry advertising expenditure was 59% of 
the world total (Film Daily Yearbook 1940 pp 37).  
 
The Majors have been particularly adept at segmenting markets, targeting audiences, 
positioning their movies and building brands.  Since the early 1910s, ‘Old 
Hollywood’ successfully developed the star system and film genres into market 
segmentation strategies that would ensure that new movies with no brand equity had 
an in-built core audience to target. For decades the Major studios have considered 
genre to be a critical factor affecting decisions to green-light movies.  
 
We found no evidence of Hollywood’s rivals exhibiting a similar set of promotional 
capabilities, yet in other industries foreign firms have often outperformed US 
companies in terms of new product launches. 
 
 
5. The Majors’ Pricing capabilities 
 
The historical evidence demonstrates that over time the Majors have indirectly 
induced audiences to pay continually increasing ticket prices to watch Hollywood’s 
movies in theatres on the big screen, despite increasing competition from direct 
product substitutes like home video and pay TV. 
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It is essential in marketing to send consistent signals to consumers so that price 
reinforces promotion and other marketing elements.  Hollywood invested heavily in 
high quality production values (the world’s leading movie stars, expensive special 
effects, costume design, elaborate sets, location shooting, cinematography etc.) that 
sent potential audiences signals of quality. Research by Basuroy, Desai and Talukdar 
(2006) indicates that the Majors still use price to signal high quality. 
The Majors have throughout their history used their superior capabilities in new 
product development, distribution and promotion to leverage premium priced film 
rentals from movie theatres, which in turn, used premium ticket pricing strategies 
with movie-going audiences comprising innovators, early adopters and the early 
majority. 
 
The customers of the Major studios are the movie theatres that sign a contractual 
license to exhibit each new movie for public exhibition and in return pay the 
distributor an agreed film rental for that transaction. The average film rental figure is 
critically important to a pricing analysis because it is the only available indicator of 
the Major studios pricing policies relating to their revenues via leasing of their movies 
to theatres. Rising film rentals over time indicate that the Majors have applied a 
premium pricing strategy when leasing their films to cinemas (Film Daily Yearbooks 
– 1933-1970; Donahue (1987) pp 32 and 178; Vogel (2004) pp 58).   
 
6. The Majors’ strategic marketing management capabilities  
 
The Majors of Old and New Hollywood have always been outwardly focused on the 
business environment, the world film market and competitors, trying to ‘shape the 
environment’ to their competitive advantage. This can be seen over time in the 
ongoing MPPDA/MPAA lobby in Washington on a range of issues and also in their 
monitoring and strategic responses to threats and opportunities presented by potential 
product substitutes like radio, television, video, VOD via the Internet and digital 
cinema (Wasko 1994 pp 8-14). 
 
The narrow ‘Fordist’ view of the Majors as product-driven mass manufacturers 
ignores the bigger picture that during the Studio era, the vertically integrated Majors’ 
were quite sophisticated marketers that understood their audiences. The Majors’ 
theatre chains were designed and segmented to appeal to different types of audiences 
based on price discrimination (Variety Jan. 4th, 1956 p, 43), that theatre management 
manuals for Paramount and Fox reveal staff were trained in customer service values 
and skills, and that theatre managers provided weekly management reports including 
observations on audience composition and enjoyment v-a-v positive or  negative 
word-of-mouth, or that they also undertook various forms of marketing research 
(discussed earlier) as part of the new product development process (Franklin 1928 in 
Waller 2002 pp 158).   
 
Our examination of the senior executive rosters at the Majors at different snapshots in 
time, revealed many experienced marketing professionals in early Hollywood: 
Universal President Carl Laemmle had been a successful retailer; Universal Vice 
President Robert Cochrane previously ran a Chicago advertising agency; Famous 
Players-Paramount President Adolph Zukor had been a fur salesman; B.P. Schulberg 
his publicist had been a press agent; Al Lichtman the head of Paramount’s first 
exploitation department had been a film salesman; Paramount’s distribution chief 
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Sidney Kent had been sales manager in distribution with the U.S. Drugists Syndicate; 
William Fox had been a retailer; Columbia’s Jack Cohn and Joe Brandt had worked at 
Hampton Advertising agency in New York; MGM marketing chief Howard Dietz had 
been a copywriter in a New York ad agency. 
 
The Majors strategically managed their marketing since the late 1910s. Studio era 
MGM marketing chief Howard Dietz wrote: “the marketing with all its complications 
was in my care” (Dietz 1974 p. 256). Paramount established the first marketing 
department in 1915, in which advertising personnel, publicists and promotions staff 
reported through to a single senior executive. It was called the exploitation 
department (Staiger 1990 pp. 9-10). Such departments created the press books that 
allowed the studios to control their marketing campaigns (Laemmle in Balio 1976 pp. 
161-163; Sennett 1998 pp. 69;132). 
 
We found no evidence of rivals at home or abroad operating at this level of marketing 
sophistication since the rise of Hollywood. 
 
We conclude that unless rival firms or film industries adopt a similar marketing 
orientation and develop a similar “holistic package” of six superior strategic 
marketing capabilities, Hollywood’s dominance of the global box office is likely to 
continue.  
 
 
Part 2 : Does the Web democratize film distribution? 
 
In 2008, total U.S. online market for movie downloads/streams was only US $227 
million.  By comparison, ‘Harry Potter & Half Blood Prince’ took US $229m at the 
box office in the first 14 days of its North American release in 2009.   
 
We therefore contend that online movie distribution is a long way from reaching a 
critical mass. Consider the following observations: “The Web is a great leveller … 
this flatness creates a major challenge … how do you attract more visitors?…. 
Organisations want to build mountains or attractors in the otherwise flat landscape of 
web-based marketing” (Watson, Akselsen & Pitt, 1998). “Many have argued that the 
Internet renders strategy obsolete. In reality, the opposite is true… it is more 
important than ever for companies to distinguish themselves through strategy”  
(Porter 2001). Branding matters more on the Internet (Rubenstein & Griffiths 2001).  
“Online distributors will need to build brand awareness and brand equity in order to 
lure the traffic needed to sustain their business.” (Silver & Alpert 2003). “Sticky sites 
are ones that capture our interest and our imagination…and make you want to stay at 
the site and to return frequently” (Lewin 2009). 
 
We propose that whilst the Internet does provide a channel that potentially 
democratises film distribution for Hollywood’s rivals, the flat landscape of the Web 
means that in order to stand out from the clutter of millions of cyber-voices seeking 
attention, independent film companies need to possess superior strategic marketing 
management capabilities and develop effective e-marketing strategies to find a 
profitable market niche, attract a loyal online audience and prosper. 
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PART 3: CAN POTENTIAL SERIOUS RIVALS TO HOLLYWOOD 
EMERGE? 
 
Non-U.S. share of the global box office overtakes U.S. share 
 
In 2008 the world wide box office was worth US$28.1 billion.  The U.S./Canada 
domestic box office accounted for 35% of this, or $9.8 billion.  A simple regression 
(based on the trend 2002 -2007) suggests that the global box office will increase from 
US$28 billion in 2008 to $34 billion by 2015 and $46 billion by 2030.   
 
Perhaps more interesting is the continuing decline in the share of U.S. domestic box 
office of the global box office.   The North American market share of the global box 
office fell from 52% in 2002, to 46% in 2004, and to 35% in 2008.  The international 
or non-U.S. share of the global box office is projected to increase from 65% of the 
world-wide box office in 2008 to 71% in 2015 and 78% by 2030 (projection based on 
trends over the past decade).   
 
The following pie charts provide a longer term perspective from 1927 -2030. 
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In 1927 the U.S. domestic market equated to three quarters of the global box office, 
yet on present trends this share may be less than a quarter within a generation.  Does 
this have any implications for the continuing dominance of Hollywood?   
 
Consider recent trends in some countries.  In the period from 2002 – 2007 the Russian 
gross box office in US dollars increased 80%. The Chinese box office grew 75% over 
this period, while the Czech Republic, Brazil, Poland, Argentina and Ireland all 
increased by about 50%.  Substantial growth rates over the five years 2002 - 2007 
were also experienced by Australia (39%), UK (31%) and Canada (23%).  The U.S. 
stood out with a decline of 8%. 
 
The decline in the share of U.S. domestic box office of the global box office may be 
attributable to a number of factors of course, including differential population growth 
rates, mature vs developing economies, differential growth rates in incomes and the 
much faster increases in theater ticket prices outside the U.S.  However another 
relevant trend may be box office market share by country of origin in international 
markets.  In the European Union from 1999 – 2008, the share of films produced solely 
in the U.S. fell significantly.  European film admissions for films originating in the 
U.S. fell from 70% in 1997 – 98 to 53% in 2008.   There were increases in admissions 
across the EU for EU / US co-productions as well as for films produced in France and 
other European countries.  In France in 1999, U.S. films enjoyed double the French 
box office market share of local films.  Yet by 2008 the market share of local films 
had overtaken U.S. productions.  Similar trends could be seen in Germany, Italy and 
the U.K.   US / EU co-productions increased from 4% in 1997 – 98 to 17% of 
European admissions by 2008, with instances where the EU provides the major 
partner, almost as many as where the US provides the major partner.   
 
In some countries, particularly in Asia, locally produced films have a very significant 
share of the total box office. Japan was the second-top performing market by revenues 
at $803 million. Local films accounted for 48% of the Japanese market.  Similarly, 
local films in South Korea snared 45% of market share in that country.  However two 
countries potentially dominate the region: China and India.   
 
 
LOCAL FILM MARKET SHARES  2000-2008 (Box Office / Ticket Sales)   
          
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 % % % % % % % % % 
France 28.9 39 34 34.8 38.4 36.8 44.7 36.6 45.4 
Germany 12.5 16.2 11.9 17.5 23.8 17.1 25.8 18.9 26.2 
UK 21.04 11.73 15.4 11.9 12.4 33 19 28 31 
Italy 17.5 19.4 21.8 22 20.3 24.7 26.2 33 29.3 
Spain 10.03 18 14 15.8 13.4 17 15.4 13.5 13.3 
Japan 31.8 39 27 33 37.5 41.3 53.2 47.7 59.5 
South Korea  45.2 49.7 54.2 55 64.2 50.8 42.1 
China     55 60 55 45.9 39 
India      92.5 86 76.5 90.5 
Russia     12 27.7 23.3 26.3 25.5 
          
Source: EAO World Market Trends Focus Reports 2001-2009    
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LOCAL FILMS – NATIONAL MARKET SHARES 2000-2008 
 
Sources: European AudioVisual Observatory  Focus Reports – World Market Trends 2000-2009 
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China 
China is a potentially massive market, which is currently not dominated by 
Hollywood.  In 2007, 55% of the Chinese market was attributable to local films.  The 
communist government restricts film imports.  Even after the global financial crisis, 
China maintains a rapidly growing economy and middle class and the government has 
committed to digital cinema. The box office in China is dominated by a very few U.S. 
and Chinese productions, leaving little room for the growing number of smaller local 
productions.  No Hollywood films were approved for the first two months of 2008, 
although the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) says that 
there is no ban in place. The top 10 foreign films and the top 5 Chinese films account 
for 68.7% of the box office.  Around 100 local films found a release at the theatrical 
level out of a production level of above 400 films in 2007.  Of the recorded total, the 
top 10 foreign films entering the country on a revenue share quota basis (mainly 
Hollywood Blockbusters) earned 45.1% of the gross box office, and the top five 
foreign films 36.1%, whilst the top 5 Chinese films earned 23.6%. 
 
India 
India has the world’s largest domestic market with 3 billion admissions annually 
(double North American admissions) and yet it is NOT dominated by Hollywood.  
Like China, it has a rapidly emerging economy and middle class. In 2007 94% of the 
Indian box office was generated by home grown films. However, Hollywood is 
reported to be encroaching on this by as much as one percentage point of the box 
office each year.  India has the largest indigenous film market, worth $1,632 million 
in 2007.  
 
 
2007 
  
 POPULATION TOTAL 
NO. 
SCREENS 
NO. SCREENS 
IN 
MULTIPLEXES 
Av 
admissions 
per capita 
2008 
SCREEN 
DENSITY  
(ratio 1 
screen/per 
1,000,000 
people) 
INDIA 1.13 billion 10,189 850  
multiplex screens 
2.81 9.2 
screens/million 
CHINA 1.32 billion 36,112 3,527  
“modern screens” 
0.15 27.3 
screens/million 
USA 0.306 billion 38,974 29,170  
multiplex screens 
4.47 129 
screens/million 
Sources: Screen Digest and EAO Focus 2008 
 
The above table demonstrates that both India and China are under-screened, 
particularly in terms of multiplex / modern screens.  We can expect the 
explosion in modern screens now occurring in both countries to expand the 
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box office more than is projected below (where we project future box office 
based conservatively on recent trends in ticket prices alone).  However while 
we believe this expansion in multiplex / modern screens will increase box 
office since ticket prices are much higher for the new screens, it may not help 
Hollywood as much as one might think.  For instance the local production has 
kept pace in new multiplexes in India very well.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Projected ticket prices to 2030 
 
 
Ticket Prices – straight line extrapolation 
 
           2007          2015          2030  
India   $0.53  $1.00  $2.00  
China   $2.22  $4.50  $9.00  
 USA    $6.82  $9.00  $12.00 
 
 
2007 US $ 2015 US $ 2030 US $
Av Ticket Annual Annual Av Ticket Annual Projected Av Ticket Annual Projected
price admissions Box Office price admissions Box office price admissions Box office
India    0.53 3290 million 1.7 billion $1.00 3290 million 3.290 billion $2.00 3290 million 6.5 bn
China    2.22 196 million 0.434 billion $4.50 196 million 0.882 billion $9.00 196 million 1.584 bn
USA 6.82 1400 million 9.6 billion $9.00 1400 million 12.6 bn $12.00 1400 million 16.8 bn
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Projected box office, admissions constant 
 
 
2007 US $B 
Ann Box 
Office 
2015 US $B 
Projected 
Box Office 2030 US $B Projected Box Office 
India    1.7 3.3 6.5   
China    0.43 0.88 1.6   
USA 9.6 12.6 16.8   
 
The above diagram suggests what the box office in three countries may be in 2015 
and 2030 based on a simple extrapolation of ticket price trends 2001 -2007.  While 
both India and China start from a small base in 2007, with a combined box office only 
22% of the U.S., by 2030 their combined box office would be 48% of the U.S..  We 
can only speculate on what market share Hollywood might have of these two rapidly 
emerging markets but recent trends suggest it would not be a lay down misere (or 
absolute certainty) for Hollywood to capture dominance and growth in these two 
markets is likely to further erode its global market share, exacerbating the trend noted 
above in some other countries for a vibrant local production sector.   
 
In summary, Hollywood is likely to continue to be a dominant force in the global film 
market, but that dominance is likely to be far less pronounced than in the past. 
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